Physician Countersuits: A Cause without Action by Greenbaum, Howard
McGeorge Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 3 Article 7 
1-1-1980 
Physician Countersuits: A Cause without Action 
Howard Greenbaum 
Long Beach Veterans Administration Medical Center and University of California at Irvine College of 
Medicine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard Greenbaum, Physician Countersuits: A Cause without Action, 12 PAC. L. J. 745 (1981). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol12/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu. 
Physician Countersuits: A Cause
Without Action
HOWARD GREENBAUM*
Over the past several years, an increasing number of physicians sued
for malpractice by their patients have instituted countersuits against the
patient and the patient's attorney. Although results at the lower court
levels seemed promising initially, the enthusiasm for the countersuit
movement may have been premature in view of recent appellate court
decisions on these cases. To determine whether this perception is cor-
rect, this article will analyze the key decisions concerning physician
countersuits which have emerged in 17 states over the past five years
and compare them to decisions in physician countersuits in California.
This analysis will shed light on the specific factors considered by the
courts in reaching their decisions and offer a commentary on the viabil-
ity of the countersuit movement as it is being formulated presently by
attorneys.
Thirty-four physician countersuits decided between 1976 and 1980
have been chosen for analysis in this study.' The cases were analyzed
* B.A., College of the City of New York; M.D., University of Zurich College of Medicine;
J.D., Loyola University Law School, Los Angeles; Member of the California Bar, Medical license
in California, New York, Connecticut; Diplomate of American Board of Psychiatry and Neurol-
ogy (in Neurology); Member of American Academy of Neurology and Fellow of the American
College of Legal Medicine; currently Associate Clinical Professor of Neurology, Department of
Neurology, Long Beach Veterans Administration Medical Center and University of California at
Irvine College of Medicine.
1. See (cases listed in alphabetical order by state) Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d
411 (1976); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Weaver v.
Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978); Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978); Fee,
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for the type and number of legal theories used in each case and the
degree of success of each theory. This article first will analyze the ele-
ments of the most frequently alleged cause of action in physician
countersuits, malicious prosecution, and examine the treatment of this
cause by the courts in the states included in this study. Next, the article
will examine the cases alleging professional negligence on the part of
the plaintiffs attorney, the second most frequently raised cause of ac-
tion in this survey, and discuss the problems encountered in establish-
ing this cause. Finally, the article will examine the use and
effectiveness of various other less popular causes of action which have
been alleged in physician countersuits. This study then will review
California's legislative remedy and discuss whether it has lessened the
number of groundless malpractice suits that are filed against physi-
cians. The article will conclude that, under current legislation and case
law, physician countersuits are not capable of offering adequate protec-
tion to innocent physicians.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Malicious prosecution is the most frequently employed theory in
physician countersuits.2 Of the 34 cases studied, only three cases did
not plead a theory of malicious prosecution.' In the remaining cases,
the issue of malicious prosecution was raised in conjunction with one
or more other legal theories.4 Of the 31 cases alleging malicious prose-
Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E. 2d 1367, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 328 (1979); Davis v. Ruff, 83 Ill. App. 3d 561,
404 N.E.2d 405 (1980); Stopka v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Balthazar v.
Dowling, 65 Il. App. 3d 824, 382 N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375
N.E.2d 480 (1978); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Bickel v. Mackie,
447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v.
Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Tappan v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Hill v.
Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978); Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CA18MR, 79CA588MR
(Ky. 1980) appealpending, Spencer v. Burlass, 337 So.2d 596 (La. Ct. of App. 1976), cert. denied,
340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977); Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 264 N.W.2d 76 (1978); Friedman
v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Ackerman v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468,
412 A.2d 1054 (1979); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62
App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130
(1979); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513,569 P.2d 561 (1977); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., 256 Pa.
Super. Ct. 74, 389 A.2d 607 (1978); Peerman v. Sidicane, (Tenn. App., Middle Div., 1980) (unpub-
lished opinion on file at the Pacoc Law Journal); Butler v. Morgan, 590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 ('rex. Civ. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571
S.W.2d 567 ('ex. Civ. App. 1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (ex. Civ. App. 1976);
Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108 (Va. 1980). See generally, Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 555 (1978).
2. See generally Birnbaum, Physician Counterattack: Liability of Lawyersfor Instituting VIn-
jusFgfedMedicalMalpractice,4ctions, 45 FORDHAM L. Rav. 1003, 1020-33 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Birnbaum].
3. Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky.
1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (rex. Civ. App. 1976).
4. Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978).
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cution, two were decided in favor of the physician5 and three were re-
manded for further proceedings. 6  The remaining cases were all
decided adversely to the physician-plaintiffs, and eight of these were
decided by the highest court in the particular jurisdiction.7 The only
two successful cases were decided at the intermediate appellate level,
and one of these is now on appeal.8
The apparent difficulties in establishing malicious prosecution can be
seen by examining the elements and nature of the tort. Malicious pros-
ecution originally was intended as an action for wrongful institution of
a criminal proceeding, but since has been accepted as a cause of action
for the wrongful institution of a civil proceeding.9 The elements of this
action are four: (1) special damages beyond those ordinarily associated
with defending a civil action;'° (2) termination of the prior suit in favor
of the individual bringing the countersuit; (3) lack of probable cause in
bringing the initial suit; and (4) malice in the initiation of the prior
suit." Each element will be examined in its application to physician
countersuits.
-4. The Requirement of Special Damages
If a court wishes to dispense with a case in a swift and uncomplicated
fashion rather than discuss any theoretical issues involved, the simplest
method is to find that a necessary element of the cause of action has not
been established by the plaintiff. The process is even easier if this ele-
ment has been isolated and defined unambiguously. The rule requiring
5. Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CA18MR, 79CA558MR (Ky. App. 1980), appealpend-
ing; Peerman v. Sidicane, (Tenn. App. Middle Div., 1980) (unpublished opinion on file at the
Pacifc Law Journal).
6. Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Nelson v.
Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d
673 (1978).
7. Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Aria. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747,
602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 831 N.E.2d 1367
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62
App. Div. 2d 542, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977);
Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108 ('Va. 1980).
8. Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CAIMR, 79CA588MR (Ky. App. 1980) appealpending;
Perman v. Sidicane, (Tenn. App. Middle Div., 1980) (unpublished opinion on file at the Pacfflc
Law Journal) Petition for review in Raine was granted by the Kentucky Supreme Court after this
study was completed.
9. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §120 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See
generally C. LUTHER, SURVEY OF TORTS §§16-16.8 (3rd ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as LUTHER].
As applied to civil actions, the tort sometimes is denominated "wrongful initiation of civil pro-
ceedings." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §674 (1965); LUTHER, supra §16.7. See gener-
ally PROSSER, supra, §120.
10. Special damages are not a requirement in California. See notes 15-17 and accompanying
text infra, See generaly 4 B. WITHIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§255-261 (8th ed.
1974), (Supp. 1980).
11. See PROSSER, supra note 9, §120.
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special injury in malicious prosecution, also known as the "English
rule," is such an element, since it demands that the plaintiff prove dam-
ages sustained in the original litigation which go beyond those ordina-
rily associated with defending a civil action. 2 Nonetheless, special
damages routinely have been considered to include such injuries as
mental and emotional suffering, injury to reputation, trial costs, and, in
medical malpractice cases, the probability of increased malpractice in-
surance.13 Under the strict English rule, a demonstration of an inter-
ference with the person (arrest), property (seizure), or other special
interference with the person or his property, is necessary to prove spe-
cial injury. If interference cannot be shown, there is an absolute bar to
the action of malicious prosecution.'
4
The special damages rule is, however, the minority rule.'5 The ma-
jority of the states, including California, 6 do not require a showing of
special damages to establish malicious prosecution.' 7 Under the
"American rule," a malicious prosecution action may be maintained in
the absence of an actual interference with the person or property.' 8
Eighteen of the 31 cases in this study alleging malicious prosecution
were from English-rule jurisdictions. 9 It is not surprising to find that
in each of the 18 cases except one,2° the cause of action failed, although
12. See 381 N.E.2d at 1371.
13. See id
14. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 I11.
App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Davis v. Ruff, 83 Ill. App. 3d 651,
404 N.E. 2d 405 (1980); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 I11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Brody v.
Ruby, 267 N.W. 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980); Ackerman
v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468, 412 A.2d 1054 (1979); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392
N.E.2d 560 (1979); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs,
Inc., 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 389 A.2d 607 (1978); Butler v. Morgan, 590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108
(Va. 1980). See also Petrick v. Kaminski, 68 11. App. 3d 649, 386 N.E.2d 636 (1979) (a patient
sued a physician for malicious prosecution of an action to collect a bill for professional services).
15. The 17 jurisdictions following the minority rule are: the District of Columbia, Georgia,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 279 Or. at 518 n.3,
569 P.2d at 564 n.3.
16. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§255-261 (8th ed.
1974), (Supp. 1980).
17. The 27 states which follow the majority rule are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont and West Virginia. See
generally A.E. JAMES, LEGAL MEDICINE (1980).
18. Note, Malicious Prosecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice
Claims? 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653, 657 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Malicious Prosecution]. In
Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438, 447 (1980), the court approved the Restatement of
Torts, which includes, in addition to arrest of the person and seizure of property, harm to reputa-
tion, emotional distress, expense incurred in defending against the legal proceedings, and any
specific pecuniary loss that has resulted from the proceedings.
19. Compare the citations in notes 1 and 3 with the list of states in note 15 supra.
20. Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CA18MR, 79CA558MR (Ky. App. 1980), appealpend-
ing.
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the stringent requirement of special injury was severely criticized by at
least one of the courts z.2  In fact, two other cases decided in English-
rule jurisdictions did not even plead malicious prosecution, evidently
recognizing the almost insurmountable obstacle the rule presents.22
B. Favorable Termination of Prior Civil Action
To prevail on a malicious prosecution cause of action, the plaintiff
must show that the prior civil action terminated in his favor.2 3 Gener-
ally, a suit for malicious prosecution cannot be filed while the original
suit is pending. 4
In California, "favorable" termination does not require a "final" ter-
mination, but must reflect on the merits of the underlying action.u In
Weaver v. Superior Court,26 which involved the voluntary dismissal of
the prior action, the court, defining the term "favorable termination,"
stated that the termination should be such that it tends to indicate the
innocence of the defendant and devolves on the merits of the case.
2 7
This can occur only if there is a defense verdict or dismissal either on
the merits or for failure to prosecute, but not when the dismissal is due
to negotiations or consent,28 or when the original civil action is still
pending and undetermined. 9 In another California case, Lackner v.
LaCroix,3" a similar issue regarding the definition of favorable termi-
nation arose. In this case, the malpractice suit terminated favorably for
the physician because the jury found that it was barred by the statute of
limitations. The physician fied an action for malicious prosecution
and the trial court held that a case dismissed because of the statute of
21. See, e.g., Stopka v. Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1980) ("We believe a
reassessment of the special damages requirement in this jurisdiction is appropriate."); Petrou v.
Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979) (the court denied plaintiffs appeal, based on the
probable cause element of malicious prosecution, rather than on lack of special injuries).
22. Hill v. Wilhmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
23. See Kachig v. Booth, 22 Cal. App. 3d 626, 638-40, 99 Cal. Rptr. 393, 401-02 (1971).
24. See Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 601-02, 264 N.W.2d 76, 77 (1978). Nor may
the defendant in the original action allege malicious prosecution by cross-complaint. See Babb v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 479 P.2d 379, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1971); Baker v. Littman, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 510, 514, 292 P.2d 595, 597 (1956). The Babb court said to allow a cross-complaint for
malicious prosecution would encourage "dilatory and harrassing" actions. 3 Cal. 3d at 847, 479
P.2d at 382, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
25. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 152-58, 114 P.2d 335, 339-42 (1941). See 4 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §147 (8th ed. 1974), (Supp. 1980).
26. 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979).
27. Id. at 184-85, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
28. Id. The court, however, citing MacDonald v. Josly, 275 Cal. App. 2d 282, 79 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1969), stated that "a voluntary dismissal . . . is not ordinarily considered a dismissal on
technical grounds ... [and] though expressly made without prejudice is a favorable termination
which will support an action for malicious prosecution." 95 Cal. App. 3d at 289, 79 Cal. Rptr. at
711.
29. Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, -, 607 P.2d 438, 445 (1980).
30. Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d 747, 602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979).
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limitations, although terminating favorably for the defendant, had not
terminated on its merits. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating that a
legal determination on the merits was not necessary 3t and allowed the
case to proceed. The California Supreme Court, however, agreed with
the trial court and held that a dismissal on procedural grounds (in this
case the statute of limitations) is not on the merits.32 It now appears
that the courts have a more consistent definition of "favorable termina-
tion" than in the recent past.33
C Lack of Probable Cause
The third element of the tort of malicious prosecution is a showing
that the defendant filed the original action without probable cause to
believe the truth of the charge.34 Prosser defines probable cause as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient
to warrant an ordinarily prudent person in believing the party guilty of
an offense .3  A lack of probable cause, therefore, may arise from an
intentional disregard of the relevant circumstances, 36 or, more often,
from a failure to make a reasonable investigation of the facts. The is-
sue frequently encountered in medical malpractice cases concerns the
amount of research constituting a reasonable investigation. This prac-
tical application of the definition, on a case-by-case basis, presents con-
siderable difficulties, and may possibly represent the ultimate defeat of
most countersuits, even those in which the plaintiff passes the hurdles
of special damages and favorable termination on the merits.
In Weaver v. Superior Court,37 the court stated that as long as an
attorney does not prosecute a claim which a reasonable lawyer would
not regard as tenable, or unreasonably neglect to investigate the facts
and law in making a determination to proceed, the opposing party has
no right to assert malicious prosecution against the attorney just be-
cause the lawyer's efforts prove unsuccessful. 38 The Weaver court said
that the "reasonableness" of determining whether there is probable
cause to bring suit is defined in any given case in light of the existing
facts and circumstances.39 In a Texas case, Moiel v. Sandlin,4° the court
31. Lackner v. LaCroix, 152 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223 (1979).
32. 25 Cal. 3d at 750-52, 602 P.2d at 394-95, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 694-96.
33. See Malicious Prosecution, supra note 18, at 662 ("Despite general agreement that termi-
nation does not require an adjudication on the merits, judicial opinion is not uniform in its char-
acterization of what constitutes termination in favor of the original defendant.").
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §662 (1965).
35. PROSSER, supra note 9, §119.
36. This is not to say that a lack of probable cause may be inferred from apparently mali-
cious acts. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra.
37. 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979).
38. Id. at 188, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
39. Id. Is there a difference in the negligence aspect of malicious prosecution and ordinary
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said that
an attorney may generally rely in good faith upon the facts his client
relates. Unless lack of probable cause for a claim is obvious from the
facts disclosed by the client or otherwise brought to the attorney's
attention, he may assume the facts so disclosed are substantially cor-
rect.
4 1
Taken together, Weaver and Moiel highlight the reluctance of the
courts to impose a meaningful duty of investigation on plaintiffs' attor-
neys in medical malpractice cases. This attitude makes the proof of a
lack of probable cause extremely difficult in a physician's countersuit.
41
D. Malice
Finally, to prevail on a malicious prosecution cause of action, the
plaintiff must prove malice.43 Malice, in the context of malicious pros-
ecution, has been variously defined. At its most obvious, malice in-
cludes proof of an intentional or willful act which attempts to bring
about a wrongful result.44 But as the court noted in Weaver v. Superior
Court,45 the uniform practice is to permit an inference of malice from a
lack of probable cause, even if there is no proof of "actually demon-
strated ill will or bad faith."4 6 While such an inference appears to ben-
efit the plaintiff, the threshold for establishing lack of probable cause
may be so high that it becomes virtually impossible to prove. The in-
ference of malice becomes concomitantly more difficult.47
Aside from inferring malice from a lack of probable cause, malice
exists when the prior suit was brought for a purpose other than the
tort negligence? Weaver opined that there is. Whereas negligence liability is based on a duty of
care, malicious prosecution is not based on any particular duty. A jury might find that a defend-
ant-attorney unreasonably failed to investigate facts and was therefore negligent. While this
would support a finding of a lack of probable cause, it would not necessarily support an inference
of malice. "[The quantum of culpable conduct which must be proved to prevail as a plaintiff in a
malicious prosecution case is signocantly greater than that required to prevail in a case alleging
only negligence." Id. at 192-93, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 760 (emphasis added).
40. 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
41. Id. at 570.
42. An even more permissive attitude is apparent in the Louisiana case of Spencer v. Bur-
glass, 337 So. 2d 596 (1976). The Spencer court viewed the attorney strictly as a conduit between
the plaintiff and the courtroom. See id at 600.
43. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §261 (8th ed. 1974), (Supp.
1980).
44. See Malicious Prosecution, supra note 18, at 669.
45. 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979).
46. Id. at 188, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 757, citing Comment, Attorney Liabilityfor Malicious Prose-
cution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8 PAc. L.J. 897, 904 (1977) ("Regardless of the
theory on which a court relies to find malice, a close factual analysis of the cases suggests that
malice is almost always found from the same facts as those which establish lack of probable
cause."). The converse inference, i.e., finding a lack of probable cause from facts establishing a
motive of ill will, is not permitted generally. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at §120.
47. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
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adjudication of the alleged claim.48 Here again, however, the proof of
malice likely will be regarded by the trier of fact as co-extensive with
the proof of lack of probable cause. Thus, malice is established most
easily in the case where there is overt evidence of an intent to "vex,
injure, or annoy"49 the physician in the original action. This is not the
typical case.
E Prospects of Successfully Establishing Malicious Prosecution
In summary, it appears that in jurisdictions following the minority
English rule concerning special injury in malicious prosecution a plain-
tiff has virtually no chance of success.50 In those jurisdictions following
the majority American rule regarding damages, the chances of a
favorable decision are theoretically better, but the problems in proving
lack of probable cause are still a formidable obstacle. Barring some
definite change in the attitude of the courts, or meaningful intervention
by legislatures, physicians contemplating suits for malicious prosecu-
tion should consider the probability of success as remote at the present
time.5 t
ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
The second most frequent theory used in the physician countersuits
surveyed, was attorney professional negligence.52  Twenty of the 34
cases studied raised this allegation.53 In none of the cases was attorney
48. See PROSSER, supra note 9, §120; LUTHER, supra note 9, §16.7.
49. BAi No. 6.94.
50. In Illinois, for example, of 191 malicious prosecution cases tried from 1848 to 1980, only
8 have been successful, and none since 1934. See Stopka v. Lesser, 82 111. App. 3d 323, 326 n.3,
402 N.E.2d 781, 783 n.3 (1980).
51. It is somewhat difficult to gather complete data on the status of pending countersuit cases
at any given time, but the following is an approximation of the situation at the time this study was
done. The information was drawn from the following sources: LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE, Vol. 8, No. 2, at 52 (February 1980); MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, Vol. 5, No. 8, at 4
(August 1980); Vol. 5, No. 7, at 1, 7 (July 22, 1980); Vol. 4, No. 8, at 3 (August 31, 1979); Vol. 4,
No. 6, at 4-8 (June 25, 1979); MEDICAL LIABILITY ADVISORY SERVICE, Vol. 4, No. 6, at 1 (June
1979); PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY NEWSLETTER, Vol. 11, No. 1, at 4 (September 1979).
Cases lost at trial level in 1980-14.
Cases won at trial level in 1980 but appeals may be pending--6.
Out of court settlements in 1980-9.
The most common cause of action in the settled cases was malicious prosecution and the most
common allegation was that the attorney failed to review properly and investigate the facts prior
to filing the action. The amount ofdamages ranged from $4,000 to $28,000 and, in a few cases, a
letter of apology from the attorney to the physician was requested and received. The exact
number of physician countersuits presently pending nationwide is not known, but according to a
figure cited in MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, Vol. 4, Number 3, March 30, 1979 at 3, in California alone
there were at least 25 countersuits pending at that time and twice as many contemplated.
52. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1066.
53. See Carroll v. Kalar, 112 Ariz. 595, 545 P.2d 411 (1976); Lackner v. LaCroix, 25 Cal. 3d
747, 602 P.2d 393, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979); Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156
Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979); Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978);
Ammerman v. Newman, 384 A.2d 637 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Fee, Parker & Lloyd v. Sullivan, 379
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negligence successfully argued.
Attorney professional negligence is a theory which attempts to find
the attorney culpable in bringing the original malpractice action
against the physician. 4 The problems a plaintiff faces with this action
include issues of contract, privity, duty to third parties, and public pol-
icy.
In all but two cases, a cause of action for attorney professional negli-
gence was joined with a malicious prosecution theory." It is clear from
the tone and language of decisions from California and other states
that the courts find it inappropriate to join the attorneys under a sepa-
rate negligence cause of action.56 The reasons adduced fall into two
major groups. In the first, the courts point out that an attorney owes no
duty to a third party, especially when the third party is an adverse liti-
gant such as the defendant physician in a medical malpractice trial.57
The second reason, based on public policy, is that the courts fear that
imposing the threat of third party legal malpractice liability on attor-
neys would so interfere with their functions that an individual citizen's
So.2d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 328 (1979); Davis v. Ruff, 83 Ill. App. 3d 561, 404 N.E.2d 405 (1980); Stopka v.
Lesser, 82 Ill. App. 3d 323, 402 N.E.2d 781 (1980); Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1257 (1978); Pantone v. Demos, 59 Ill. App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Lyddon v.
Shaw, 56 IlL App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Iowa
1978); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438
(1980); Tappan v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky.
1978); Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CAI8MR, 79CA558MR (Ky. App. 1980), appealpending;
Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. of App. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So. 2d 990 (La. 1977);
Gasis v. Schwartz, 80 Mich. App. 600, 264 N.W.2d 76 (1978); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App.
429, 268 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Ackerman v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468, 412 A.2d 1054 (1979);
Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778,
386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130 (1979); O'Toole v. Frank-
lin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Garcia v. Wall & Ochs, Inc., 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 389 A.2d
607 (1978); Peerman v. Sidicane, (Tenn. App. Middle Div., 1980) (unpublished opinion on file at
the Pacific Law Journal); Butler v. Morgan, 590 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Martin v.
Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (rex. Civ. App. 1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108
(Va. 1980).
54. Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1979).
55. Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386
N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).
56. See Norton v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922-23, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 240-41 (1975).
57. The initial question ... is whether an attorney can be held civilly liable to one,
other than his client, who claims to have been damaged as a result of the alleged negli-
gence of that attorney .... Traditionally, this has been answered in the negative based,
among other things, on lack of privity between the parties.
Ackerman v. Lagano, 412 A.2d 1055 (N.J. 1978), citing Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 1181 (1972).
In Friedman v. Dorzorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 435, 268 N.W.2d 673, 676 (1978), the court declared
that
The courts of this state have consistently held that an attorney is not liable to third
parties for the negligent performance of his obligation to a client, even where such negli-
gence results in damage to third parties.
A similar rule appears in Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d 166, 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. 745,
751 (1979).
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protected right of full access to the judicial system would be impaired.5 8
The question of privity between an attorney and adverse party was
considered in California in Norton v. Hines.59 In that case, the plaintiff
refused to include the attorneys in the malicious prosecution cause of
action and instead named them in a separate negligence count.6 0 The
trial court sustained a demurrer against this count without leave to
amend.61 The Court of Appeal first discussed the traditional concept of
lack of privity between a lawyer and an injured third party, and the
absence of a duty owed by a lawyer to anyone other than his client.
The court then traced the development of a limited duty to third parties
on an intended third party beneficiary theory. 62 However, the court
continued that "in the case at bar a former litigant is suing adverse
counsel. Clearly, an adverse party is not an intended beneficiary of the
adverse counsel's client."' 63 After further justifying this concept under
public policy doctrines, the court, following other jurisdictions con-
fronted with this issue, proceeded to advise the plaintiff that his true
cause of action lay in malicious prosecution.' Such advice will lead
plaintiffs in a futile circle with no realistic hope of relief.65
LESS POPULAR ACTIONS
Less frequently used legal theories in physician countersuits include:
58. A California court noted that
California courts, in refusing to impose a duty of care owed by an attorney to an adverse
third party have recognized that "the burden of imposing liability upon defendant" at-
torney outweighs "the consequences to the community if liability. . . is withheld."
Weaver v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 179, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 751. When this concept isjoined with the English rule of special injury or the ambiguities of probable cause, it is obvious
why a countersuit plaintiff is effectively excluded from realistically pursuing an adequate remedy.
59. 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr 237 (1975).
60. Id. at 919, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
61. Id. at 924, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
62. Id. The court cited Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr, 821(1961), which involved third party beneficiaries to a will, and Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d
769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971), which involved a collection agency's loss of a debt owed due to the
lack of diligent prosecution by the attorney. Freese v. Lemon, 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973), stands
in contrast to California's narrow definitions of third party liability of attorneys. In Freese the
Supreme Court of Iowa found that a cause of action could be sustained against a physician. Id at
579-80.
63. 49 Cal. App. 3d at 921, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
64. Id. at 924, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 242; see Balthazar v. Dowling, 65 Ill. App. 3d 824, 382
N.E.2d 1257 (1978); cf. Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978). See notes 2-
53 and accompanying text supra.
65. This is especially true in English rule jurisdictions requiring a showing of special dam-
ages for malicious prosecution. If a third party plaintiff cannot sue an attorney for professional
negligence because of public policy and is referred back to a malicious prosecution cause of ac-
tion, and if the same public policy (to avoid a chilling effect on free access to the courts) is the
reason for the insurmountable barrier of special injury, then indeed, the plaintiff is effectively
excluded from the legal process himself. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978). "The special damage rule was initially adopted by our Supreme Court for policy
reasons to assure every litigant free and open access to the judicial system without fear of a coun-
tersuit for malicious prosecution." Id.
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(1) abuse of process; (2) prima facie tort; (3) barratry; (4) invasion of
privacy; (5) unprofessional conduct by the attorney; and (6) defamation
and intentional infliction of mental distress. In all except one case,66
these causes of action failed. In fact, it is extremely doubtful that any
of these actions will ever prove successful because the pattern of the
court decisions has been, as already noted, to simply refer the plaintiff
back to the "appropriate" cause of action-malicious prosecution.67
A. Abuse of Process
Abuse of process is the intentional misuse of a legitimate court proc-
ess for some ulterior or collateral purpose. 8 It sometimes is considered
a form of extortion.6 ' Twelve of the 34 cases studied advanced the the-
ory of abuse of process in combination with some other cause of ac-
tion.
Abuse of process theories in physician countersuits have been re-
jected by most courts.71 The general view is that an allegation of insti-
tution of a groundless civil suit is not sufficient alone to state a cause of
action for abuse of process.72 The reason is that when process is used in
a technically correct manner, that is, to institute a suit, the process has
not been abused even though the suit is without merit. 3 In the Texas
case of Martin v. Trevino,' the physician-plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendants obtained the issuance of a citation in the earlier malpractice
case in order to "profit at the physician's expense" by at least coercing a
settlement even though they did not have a good faith belief in the
66. Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CAI8MR, 79CA558MR (Ky. App. 1980), appealpend-
ing. The court allowed damages for injury to reputation based on defamatory statements in the
complaint. This is an unusual decision since in the other cases in which the courts have discussed
defamation, the general rule has been that the judicial process itself confers immunity on state-
ments made. See CAL. Cw. CODE §472 (confers a privilege on all publications in a civil proceed-
ing).
67. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
68. See generally 4 B. WrniuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§263-270 (8th ed.
1974).
69. "It is unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that the prior civil proceeding terminated in
his favor, or that the process was obtained without probable cause." PROSSER, supra note 9, §121
at 856.
70. See generally Tappan v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376 (10th Cir. 1979); Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.
Supp. 1376 (Iowa 1978); Umansky v. Urguhart, 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978);
Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Il1. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979),
rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 11. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978);
Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978); Freidman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268
N.W.2d 673 (1978); Ackerman v. Lagano, 172 N.J. Super. 468, 412 A.2d 1054 (1978); Drago v.
Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 788, 386 N.E.2d 821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62
App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1978); Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 260 S.E.2d 130
(1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
71. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1033.
72. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); 4 B. WITKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts §268 (8th ed. 1974).
73. See generally PROSSER, supra note 9, §121, at 856.
74. 578 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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merits of the case.75 The court held that the complaint failed to allege
an improper use of the citation, stating:
In contrast to an action for abuse of process, an action for malicious
prosecution is generally available against one who maliciously
caused process to issue and without probable or reasonable cause. In
an abuse of process action, however, generally the original issuance
of a legal process is justified, but the process itself is subsequently
used for a purpose for which it was not designed.76
Abuse of process may not succeed even when the plaintiff in the orig-
inal malpractice action asserts a claim or theory specifically foreclosed
under existing law. In the California case of Umansky v. Urguhart,77
an action against a physician for wrongful death, the plaintiff prayed
for punitive damages notwithstanding a statutory prohibition against
such damages in wrongful death cases.7" By stipulation, an amended
complaint was filed which removed the request for punitive damages.
The physician then filed a countersuit for abuse of process, asserting
inter alia that the defendants' sole reasons for originally asking for pu-
nitive damages were the ulterior motive of embarrassing the doctor and
pressuring him into a settlement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
dismissal of the doctor's suit, commenting that despite the current stat-
utory bar to punitive damages, the law is not immutable and it is there-
fore reasonable for an attorney to hope he might change existing law.7 9
B. Prima Facie Tort
Five cases 0 advanced the theory of prima facie tort, that is, the "in-
tentional malicious injury to another by otherwise lawful means with-
out economic or social justification, but solely to harm the other."'8
Prima facie tort is by definition an act that does not fall within the
categories of the traditional torts.8" It is a relatively amorphous con-
cept that apparently has not received wide acceptance. In none of the
75. See id. at 769.
76. Id See also Drago v. Buonagurio, 89 Misc. 2d 171, 172, 391 N.Y.S.2d 61, 62 (1977)
("The gist of the action for abuse of process lies in the improper use of process after it is issued,
and not for its issuance."). For a discussion of the very infrequently used action ofchamperty and
maintenance, see Lur v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347, 350 (Nev. 1971).
77. 84 Cal. App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978).
78. See Stenrel Aero Engineering Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App. 3d 978, 985, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 694 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §377.
79. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 372, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 549-50.
80. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828
(1979), rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 386 N.E.2d
821, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978); Hoppenstein v. Zemek, 62 App. Div. 2d 979, 403 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1978); Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560 (1979); Martin v. Trevino, 578
S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
81. Morrison v. National Broadcasting Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409,
rev'don other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 453, 280 N.Y.S.2d 641, 227 N.E.2d 572 (1967).
82. Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560 (1979).
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five cases involved here did the theory succeed. The courts disdainfully
view a pleading of prima facie tort as an attempt either to cure defec-
tive allegations of malicious prosecution, 83 or to create a new cause of
action for insulted physicians.84 The courts disapprove of both at-
tempts. California apparently has not directly addressed the issue
yet.85
C Barratry
Three cases raised allegations of barratry,"6 which is the offense of
"frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and lawsuits."87 As a ve-
hicle for physicians' countersuits, barratry is virtually useless. In Berlin
v. Nathan88 and Lyddon v. Shaw,8 9 the Appellate Court of Illinois dis-
missed barratry claims by stating that it is the general practice, and not
the particular act, that defines barratry. In Moiel v. Sandlin, ° the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the offense of barratry is a
public remedy and not a private one.91
California defines barratry in Penal Code Section 158 as "the prac-
tice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings," and punishes viola-
tions as misdemeanors.92 Conviction requires institution of at least
three proceedings with "corrupt or malicious intent to vex or annoy." 93
There is no indication that California courts would sustain a physi-
cian's private right of action based on the barratry statute, especially
for a single meritless suit.
D. Invasion of Privacy
Invasion of privacy has also been used by countersuing physicians
primarily in an attempt to prove actual damages in malicious prosecu-
tion.94 The nature of the tort as applied in physician countersuits, in-
volves either an intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion,
public disclosure of private facts, or publicity which places the plaintiff
83. For example, see 64 Ill. App. 3d at 950-51, 381 N.E.2d at 1374.
84. For example, see 578 S.W.2d at 773.
85. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1051-66.
86. Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828
(1979), rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685
(1978); Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
87. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 137 (5th ed. 1979).
88. 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d 1367 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979), rehearing
denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
89. 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978).
90. 571 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
91. Id. at 571.
92. See CAL. PENAL CODE §158.
93. Id. §159.
94. See Tappan v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 381-82 (10th Cir. 1979); Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d
11, 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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in a false light in the public eye." Two of the cases studied here raised
invasion of privacy. Both were dismissed because, as in defamation,
publications or disclosures in judicial proceedings are privileged.96
E. Unprofessional Conduct
Seven cases 97 alleged that the attorney's behavior in the original
medical malpractice case was in conflict with those provisions of the
local professional code of conduct for the bar regarding the diligent
and proper investigation and research of a case. The professional code
generally was considered not directly relevant or binding by the courts,
and in no instance was the argument successful.98
A number of countersuit plaintiffs relied on violations of local codes
of professional conduct and related statutes to show that a case had
been filed without probable cause. In general, the courts dismissed this
approach by either stating that no breach of the code had occurred or
observing that even if the attorney was in violation of some of the stat-
utory code sections or professional codes of the bar association, this did
not create a private cause of action for civil damages. 99
F Other Causes
Other applicable causes not raised in the cases included in this sur-
vey are defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. °0
These causes have met with little success because of judicial privilege in
case of the former and the requirement of outrageous conduct in the
case of the latter.'0 '
CALIFORNIA'S SOLUTION TO THE PHYSICIANS' PLIGHT
Since at present the judiciary appears unwilling to deal with the
problem of unjustified medical malpractice actions in a realistic fash-
ion, 10 2 physicians must seek relief in the legislature. An effective stat-
95. See PROSSER, .spra note 9, §117 at 804-14. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§334-349 (8th ed. 1974).
96. See 599 F.2d at 381-82; Wolfe v. Arroyo, 543 S.W.2d, 11, 13 (rex. Civ. App. 1976).
97. Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.E. Iowa 1978); Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d
331, 334-35 (Ky. 1978); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 953, 381 N.E.2d 1367, 1376-77
(1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979),rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979); Brody v. Ruby, 267
N.W.2d 902, 906-07 (Iowa 1978); Friedman v. Dozorc, 83 Mich. App. 429, 268 N.W.2d 673, 674-
76 (1978); Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 779, 386 N.E.2d 821, 822, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911
(1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
98. See generally, Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1074-77.
99. See, e.g., 447 F. Supp. at 1383; 561 S.W.2d at 334-35; 64 Ill. App. 3d at 953, 381 N.E.2d at
1376; 267 N.W.2d at 906-07; 83 Mich. App. at 431-37, 268 N.W.2d at 674-76; 578 S.W.2d at 770;
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 522-24, 569 P.2d 561, 566 (1977).
100. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1042-5 1.
I01. See Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1042-51.
102. In Lyddon v. Shaw, 56 Ill. App. 3d 815, 372 N.E.2d 685 (1978) and Hill v. Willmoii, 561
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ute ideally should address the procedural factors which lead to
unwarranted suits. In this way, the more difficult issue of determining
the motives of a plaintiff in initiating a suit need not become an issue,
when they cannot be determined. 1 3 Regardless of the motives for
bringing an action, the obvious lack of probable cause in bringing an
unjustified action would be a much more easily identifiable issue on
which to base the liability of a defendant in a countersuit. Thus, liabil-
ity would be indicated in those cases in which no medical reviewer
could find any medical merit in the case, or where inappropriate parties
are named as defendants. If malpractice actions could be screened
early on the basis of these two criteria, it is likely that a large portion of
the nonmeritorious actions could be eliminated prior to trial."°  How-
ever, such a procedure could create problems for plaintiffs' attorneys in
medical malpractice cases since obtaining medical opinions may be dif-
ficult. 015 Furthermore, the attorney may be reluctant to name all possi-
ble defendants, and obtaining the necessary material for a proper
investigation from the defendants in a timely fashion may be diffi-
cult. 06
S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1978), the court returned the cases for further trial on the issue of malicious
prosecution, although the statistical evidence indicates this is an empty gesture.
A puzzling case is reported in MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, July 22, 1980, at 7. In this case, an
insurance company settled a medical malpractice case for $1,250, apparently against the doctor's
wishes. The physician sued the insurance company on the theory that by settling the case, the
company had deprived him of the opportunity to bring a malicious prosecution countersuit action.
The trial court ruled against the physician but the appellate court reversed, allowing the case to
proceed. What is odd about this case is that it occurred in Illinois, a state which has consistently
denied plaintiffs a cause of action based on malicious prosecution because of the special injury
rule. The court apparently based its decision on a legal theory which at the present time cannot be
effectively pursued in that jurisdiction.
103. Malice becomes a question of fact whenever the defendant is accused of (1) bringing the
action solely out of spite, ill will, or harrassment; (2) failing to properly investigate the facts or law
prior to filing an action, or maintaining the action when such information becomes available and
no longer supports the action; (3) filing the action in an attempt to exact a settlement from the
insurance carrier or the hope that the company will find it economically beneficial to settle a
groundless case rather than pay the substantial costs of defending; (4) initiating a suit in response
to a physician's claim for an unpaid bill; (5) naming a physician for the sole purpose of obtaining
his opinion because of inability in obtaining expert opinion. See generally Birnbaum, supra note
2, at 1017-18.
104. There is a large group of cases which have little or no merit in the medical facts, but
present major defense problems because of the evidentiary and credibility problems of inade-
quately documented medical records. The only way to deal effectively with this group of cases is
for medical practitioners to maintain the most complete and accurate medical records possible.
105. See Hart v. Browne, 103 Cal. App. 3d 947, 163 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1980) (a patient sued the
medical expert who reviewed her records and advised her attorneys that there was no medical
negligence, and her attorneys for allowing the statute of limitations to run on a medical malprac-
tice claim and failing to obtain a second expert medical consultation). In Togstad v. Vesel, Otto,
Miller and Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) the Minnesota Supreme Court found an attorney
liable for $650,000 in legal malpractice for failing to check hospital records or to discuss a case
with a medical expert regarding a possible medical malpractice claim, before advising the patient
there was no case.
106. At times, an attorney may be caught in what appears to be a serious dilemma. On the
one hand, if he names inappropriate defendants, he may be liable in an action for malicious
prosecution; on the other hand, if he fails to name a defendant and the statute of limitations runs,
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California has attempted to meet these problems by requiring a cer-
tificate of merit in medical malpractice cases. 10 7 This certificate must
be filed by the plaintiffs attorney on or before the date of service of the
complaint on any defendant. 08 The certificate may make one of the
following declarations: (1) that the attorney has reviewed the facts of
the case, has consulted with at least one physician and surgeon or den-
tist regarding the merits of the case, and has concluded that there is
reasonable and meritorious cause for filing; 0 9 (2) that such consulta-
tion could not have been obtained prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations;" 0 or (3) that the attorney was unable to obtain such
consultation after three separate good faith attempts with three sepa-
rate experts."' Excluded from the requirements of filing a certificate
are situations in which the attorney intends to rely solely on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur or on a failure to inform of the consequences of a
medical procedure." 2 Failure to fie a certificate is a ground for a de-
murrer." 3 A violation of the provisions of this section "may constitute
unprofessional conduct and be grounds for discipline against the attor-
ney."' 14
While the certificate of merit is a step forward in the countersuit
area, the statute leaves considerable latitude for improvement. For ex-
ample, the provision that an attorney review the facts of the case may
not offer the protection it seems. While the provision presumably re-
quires the attorney at least to review the medical records, it conceivably
could allow the attorney merely to rely on the representations of the
client.' '5 Moreover, the certificate covers only the period of time prior
to serving the complaint." 6 Even though much more information is
acquired during the ensuing period of discovery, there is no provision
for an update of the certificate by the attorney to allow for the dismissal
of the case or of certain defendants, based on later-acquired informa-
tion. Furthermore, the remedy for failure to comply lies with a disci-
he may be liable for malpractice to his client. For a lively discussion of whether this concern is
more theoretical than real, see Comment, Liabilityfor Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malfprac.
lice: Do They Overlap? 8 PAC. L.J. 897 (1977).
107. See CAL. CIv, PROC. CODE §411.30. The Section is to be repealed in January, 1984, in
accordance with its own provisions; id. §411.300); 10 PAC. L.J., REvIEw OF SELECTED 1978 CALI-
FORNIA LEGISLATION 595 (1979). See generally, Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 1077-84; see also
Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (discussion of the Texas approach).
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §411.30(a).
109. Id. §411.30(b)(1).
110. Id. §411.30(b)(2).
111. Id. §411.30(b)(3).
112. Id. §411.30(d).
113. Id. §411.30(h).
114. Id. §411.30(g).
115. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
116. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §411.30(a).
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plinary body and not with the injured party." 7 It clearly is not an
invitation for personal tort actions nor have other jurisdictions consid-
ered such a law to be the foundation of such actions." 8 It remains to
be seen whether such disciplinary sanctions will be applied, and if so,
to what extent and to what effect. Finally, a recent amendment pro-
vides that the certificate of merit procedure does not apply to malprac-
tice plaintiffs who are not represented by an attorney. 119 While it may
be assumed that appearing in propria persona significantly reduces the
probability of success in a medical malpractice suit, it also may be as-
sumed that a significant number ofpro se plaintiffs have nonmeritori-
ous cases. Elimination of the certificate of merit for this class of
plaintiffs thus removed an important protective device for physicians.
CONCLUSION
The rapid increase of medical malpractice actions has inevitably
brought with it a number of cases which physicians believe are non-
meritorious, either as to the medical facts or to specifically named de-
fendants. Putting motivation for bringing the suit aside, the primary
problem appears to be failure by the attorney to investigate properly
the case prior to filing a complaint or failure to dismiss certain causes
of action or specific defendants after more detailed information is ob-
tained during discovery. Emphasizing public policy considerations
based on the desire to retain open access to the judicial system, appel-
late courts, for the most part, have been reluctant to recognize any of
the causes of action physicians have brought against attorneys and their
clients in countersuit actions.' 20
117. Id. §411.30(g).
118. See, e.g., Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (Iowa 1978); Martin v. Trevino, 578
S.W.2d 763, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
119. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §411.30(i); 11 PAC. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECTED 1979 CALI-
FORNIA LEGISLATION 668, 669 (1980).
120. A few cases have ended in favor of the physician-plaintiff in out of court settlements, see
note 46 infra, and two very recent cases in the physicians' favor at the trial level have been upheld
at the intermediate appellate level. Raine v. Drasin, Docket Nos. 79CA18MR, 79CA558MR (Ky.
1980) appealpending; Peerman v. Sidicane, (Tenn. App. Middle Div., 1980) (unpublished opinion
on file at the Pacifc Law Journal). The fact that one of these is currently on appeal and the other
was decertified underscores the physician's plight. As pointed out earlier, of nine cases to reach a
state's highest court, eight decisions were unfavorable for the physician-plaintiff, see note 7 and
accompanying text supra, and one was remanded for further consideration of the malicious prose-
cution issue, Nelson v. Miller, 227 Kan. 271, 607 P.2d 438 (1980). Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. Adv.
Opinion 186, 615 P.2d 957 (1980), a recent Nevada case not included in this survey, is one of the
apparently few successful countersuits. In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a
$35,000 compensatory damage verdict in favor of the physician based on the fact that the underly-
ing suit had been filed without obtaining hospital records or review by a physician, and based on
the finding of fact by the jury that the case had been filed solely for the purpose of coercing a
"nuisance settlement" from the physician's carrier. The Nevada Supreme Court also affirmed a
$50,000 punitive damages award, since the action was fied "intentionally and with reckless disre-
gard of the consequences." 96 Nev. Adv. Opinion 186, at 4-5, 615 P.2d at 961.
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While the concern of the judiciary is understandable, it has effec-
tively excluded countersuit plaintiffs from a remedy for a perceived
wrong. While such public policy decisions are not unique, they usually
are confined to specific situations and are not overly diffuse in their
effect.' 21 The question is whether such broad and diffuse requirements
as are imposed in establishing a countersuit case are really necessary.
There is no reason that a middle position cannot be achieved which
would give physicians protection from frivolous and unwarranted mal-
practice actions, and yet not be so broad as to jeopardize the free access
to the judicial system by creating a climate in which attorneys are fear-
ful of accepting all but the totally obvious and predictably successful
cases. This can be accomplished by screening cases based on those fac-
tors which indicate a lack of probable cause in bringing the case, or,
conversely, by identifying specific basic requirements of investigation
which, if performed, would reasonably insure that there is probable
cause for bringing an action. In this manner, the situation could be
resolved to the satisfaction of both sides on this issue. Since the courts
appear disinclined at present to move on this problem, legislative inter-
vention is the only effective method left to protect the interests of inno-
cent physicians.
121. For example, good samaritan statutes exempt a physician from liability when rendering
care at the scene of an emergency. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144. A physician is required
to report to the local health officer any person diagnosed as suffering from a disorder involving
lapses of consciousness so that the information may be given to the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §410.
